The proposed work aims to develop a novel scheme, which is used to capture the spatial -temporal patterns of a normal flash crowd event, and to find the Application layer DDoS (App-DDoS) attacks. The low level layers are not efficient enough to differentiate the App-DDoS attacks from the usual flash crowd events. The objective of this work is to find an effective method to identify whether the surge in traffic is caused by App-DDoS attackers or by normal trust users. A flash crowd is a large spike or surge in traffic to a particular website. The proposed research work aims at the following. seconds, during the burst web workload. From the maximum correlation coefficient 0.9986, among the sequence of request numbers, and that of the user numbers, it is seen that the usual flash crowd is mainly caused by the sudden increase in user requests.
will be employed as a model of the static access permissions, in any type of access by providing trust in it. The access rights cannot be changed for a certain period of time.
The AM has been initially formalized by Harrison, Russo, and Ullman (HRU model) . In earlier stages, many of the defense systems were used. Later, when the HRU (Harrison Ruzzo Ullman) model was proposed, it was found to have well-built feature, and hence is more powerful than the earlier defense systems. The security of the HRU model cannot be determined in common. The security problem is more difficult to identify, whether or not a given subject can gain an access privilege to a known object.
If there is a method that is capable of properly identifying this, then the security problem is said to exit.
In this work, AM is combined with trust models, and the approval of access rights decision is decided by predicates over a subject or object attributes. For instance, a web user (subject) can download a music file (object) only , when his/her credit (attributes) is more than a stable value. The AM seems to be more powerful than the HRU, and it's security is desirable.
An AM is specified by a set of subjects, a set of objects, and a fixed set of commands. A command gets a set of object parameters as key, and revises the matrix by adding or deleting right(s) in a cell. The objects are disturbed, due to changes on existence rights of a cell. A system state varies through the execution of commands.
The following equation shows the access rights of AM. In Eq. 1 s 1 , s 2 … s n denotes subjects, o 1 , o 2 …o n denotes objects, r 1 , r 2 …r n, denotes access rights and the subject parameters are represented as AM is an abstract model of permissions at a known point of time. A factual implementation of it is a two-dimensional array and it needs more memory space. Capability-based defense systems and ACLs are real access control methods, whose static permissions will be modeled using Access Control Matrices. Though, these two mechanisms have been presented as row-based and column-based implementations of the AM , this vision has been analyzed as deceptive correspondence between systems, that does not obtain dynamic behavior.
The two main implementations of AM, are ACLs and capabilities. Access Control
Lists are attained by all subjects as a list of users, and their access rights to the object are estimated by trust models. Capabilities are accomplished by objects as a resource and the access rights of every subject. It gives every user a key ring with efficiency. To eliminate access to a specific object, every user (subject) that has access to it must be "touched". A touch is an examination of a user's right to that object and potential elimination of rights.
This returns the difficulty of sweeping changes in access rights.
Access Control Lists and Capabilities

Access Control Lists
The Access Control Lists (ACLs), are used to identify, manage, and filter Application Layer DDoS attacks, in a network of AM implementation. They filter the packet flow to control the network traffic, and to restrict the network use from unwanted users or devices. ACL is in the router, and it does not have the ability to capture the packets, which is captured by AM. The basic syntax for a standard ACL is given below.
Standard ACLs control the network access to specific hosts or networks. These ACLs are used to filter the unwanted traffic on the source address of the IP packets.
Extended ACLs filter the specific types of traffic on source and destination IP addresses.
The basic syntax for an extended ACL is n  destinatio  address  IP  n  destinatio  mask  source   address  IP  source  protocol  deny  or  permit  199  to  100  list  -access The source and destination address of the IP packet traffic has been controlled by ACL protocol. Extended ACL uses identification numbers from 100 to 199. Like Standard ACLs, Extended ACLs can also use names instead of numbers.
Extended access list includes additional information, to filter App-DDoS traffic in AM, using specific port and service, such as FTP and Telnet. Operators such as eq (equals), gt (greater than), and range (of port numbers) are added to the syntax, to determine how the App-DDoS traffic will be filtered by AM. The syntax for an extended ACL using the port or service follows. Remarks can be added before or after an entry in an ACL, which is used to describe the function of the ACL admission. The fundamental syntax for an ACL remark is as follows.
access-list <1 to 99> remark <purpose of the deny or permit statement> Masks used in ACL statements are known as inverse or wildcard masks. These masks are similar to standard IP address subnet masks, but they are actually written in a reverse format. Based on the consideration of trust value, the ACL masks indicate which traffic to be permitted or denied. The binary ones and zeros in the mask decides the processing status of the IP address in network traffic. A zero bit in the inverse mask indicates that the corresponding IP address is allowed into the network, and a one bit indicates that the corresponding IP address is denied from the network.
The most frequent hit entries should appear first in an ACL. This saves the AM, from additional processing of checking unnecessary lines in an ACL. There is an implicit deny statement at the end of all access lists, even if it is not given. An ACL should have a minimum of one permit statement, otherwise, it will block the traffic.
Packet filtering should be done as early as possible in the network using ACLs.
Discarding the App-DDoS traffic at the earlier stage has the following benefits. 
The impact of any DDoS attack is limited to the perimeters of the network  Systems are protected from being overloaded  Attackers are restricted from using internal systems to attack other sites  Identifying and restricting Infected Networks with ACLs.
When a DDoS attack occurs in a network, it is very significant to separate or eliminate the infected network(s). It would be better to spend a few minutes to block an infected host or a subnet, than to spend hundreds of man hours to protect the network.
The App-DDoS attacks have the ability to spread quickly (like Slammer), that it would be impossible to isolate the infected hosts from the ACL. The following steps are used to trace the infected host(s) with the help of the logging ACL.
Step 1.
Apply a logging ACL to each active Ethernet or Fast Ethernet interface. Check that the ACL is applied in the identical direction (in/out) , and to monitor the ACL functioning.
Step 2.
Run the 'terminal monitor' command to monitor the ACL hits in a short period of time.
Step 3.
Capture the data, and store it as a text file.
Step 4.
After a few minutes, cancel the terminal monitor using the 'terminal no monitor' command, to stop output to the screen.
Step 5.
Again reapply the Logging ACL.
Step 6.
Analyze the captured data that are consistent, which easily identifies the DDoS attacks and infected source IP addresses.
Step 7.
Use the 'show IP route <source IP address>' command on the router, to identify the interface where the potentially infected host is connected.
Step 8.
Modify the blocking ACL (either a complete block or blocking malicious traffic)
by adding the infected host IP addresses or subnet.
Step 9.
Apply the blocking ACL in each Ethernet or Fast Ethernet interface to the network for preventing the malicious traffic.
Access Capabilities
Access Capabilities are used to find the forgeable references accurately, so that the AM system security is enhanced. In AM, forgeable references find an object, but does not identify access rights which are suitable for that object , and the AM holds the status of the references. Accordingly, any effort to access the referenced object should be authenticated by the operating system, through the use of an ACL.
In this AM, access boundaries such as ACL and capabilities are not sufficient. In some cases, information requires to be more protected by an authority than the information holder. It means the flow of information requires to be prohibited from and to the less safe user. They are connected through a Markov process with trust models, rather than being independent of each other.
Hidden Markov Model
DDoS detection by AM based HMM
The In the mechanism of AM based HMMs, AM is used to record frequently observed spatial-temporal patterns, and it is dynamically updated to detect the new temporal patterns. To update the AM, frequently observed temporal patterns can be selected and added to the AM by two methods. One, is to select temporal patterns that were observed for atleast m times in a given time period. And the other, is to select temporal patterns that have packet numbers larger than n. Actually, the two selection approaches can be combined, and the temporal patterns that satisfy both the conditions, can be selected while achieving the highest trust value. Then, the collection of recently appeared temporal patterns can be viewed in the normal flash crowd.
A indicates that a DDoS attack is happening, it can send messages to the filtering module in a boundary router, so that certain response actions can be taken to trace and stop the DDoS attacks.
Figure 3.1 AM based HMM for DDoS attack detection
The AM module is employed, to dynamically select temporal patterns that are frequently observed by the system. Since, the information of a single detection agent is usually inadequate to accurately detect high level DDoS attacks, the information sharing among multiple agents will be essential to improve the detection precision and reliability. 
Trust and AM based HMM models on target servers
In this section, experimentation of trust and AM based HMM models on target servers are performed. For experimental evaluation, the legitimate user model, and the attacker model has been constructed with several attack approaches of different complexity.
The proposed attack mitigation model of AM based HMM, that provides the trust is deployed on the target server, by making the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1
In session flooding attacks, the restricted access to a server is the utmost number of concurrent session connections, called as MaxConnector. It does not depend only on the bandwidth of the server, but also on additional resources of the server, such as CPU, memory and maximal database links.
Assumption 2
With no attacks, the entire session connections on the server must be much lesser than MaxConnector, like lesser than 20% of MaxConnector, as a server might set the threshold greatly higher to tolerate the potential explode of requests, example, flash crowds on websites.
Legitimate user model
In contradiction of attackers, legitimate users are users who demand services to their advantages for the content of the services. Thus, the inter-arrival time of requests from a legitimate user, might structure a certain distribution density at time 't'. The user model is constructed in the following way with the support of trust models.

Employ traces of internet accesses to construct a primary model density o(t),
where t is an inter-arrival time, and density at time 't' is the possibility a legitimate user will return to the service after t seconds. Three different data sets are traced in this experiment, two from academic surroundings and one from a profitable internet provider.

User model density i+1 (t) is reconstructed with the recently composed inter-arrival times of every legitimate user, after d days in model density i (t), where d is arbitrarily selected from [dmin, dmax] . This work constructs the latest density distribution of legitimate requests received by the proposed model server as well as the reputation of the request. It shows that density i+1 (t) is strongly resulting from density i (t), which fools the attackers.
As a practical legitimate user model, it must satisfy the following properties.
Initially, it does the user access interval distribution as early as possible. It is dynamic as the distribution might vary from time to time, it is implemented and checked in the defense method in a simple manner. The legitimate user model is able to assure the first two properties as the density function is updated frequently. It is a lightweight model, that update the density distribution of communication with trust models. It does not attempt to restrict the impact of this updation.
In this primary density distribution model, there are a number of peaks in the user demand arrival intervals. The most famous ones are in proportion to intervals of one minute, one hour and one day. The mean inter-arrival time has been found to be 25.3
hours with a median of 1.8 hours, and a standard deviation of 48.4 hours.
Attacker model
The objective of the session flooding DDoS attack is, to maintain the number of concurrent session links on the server as huge as possible, to prevent new link requests from legitimate users being received. In this way, a trust model is constructed into the system. So, an attacker might use any one of the following approaches. The attacker organizes many zombie machines or can mishandle the P2P network as an attack platform.
Approach 1
Send session link requests at a fixed rate, without considering the reply or the service capability of the victim.
Approach 2
Send session link requests at an arbitrary rate, without considering the reply or the service capability of the victim.
Approach 3
Send session link requests at an arbitrary rate, and consider the reply or the service capability of victim by regulating request rate in accordance with the proportion of received session link requests by the server.
Approach 4
Initially, send session link requests at a rate, like legitimate users to get trust from the server, and then begin attacking with one of the above attacking approaches.
These approaches vary in bandwidth rate and capability to avoid the recognition.
Approaches 1 and 2 are simple to implement, but they are too easier to be discovered, approaches 3 and 4 are more difficult, as they consider the server reply or generate a request like a legitimate users. Approach 4 needs a long-term research of attackers in order to get a high trust level. This approach requires attackers being more tolerant.
During session flooding attacks, the attackers may not spoof their IPs or alter them within a session, since a session is set up on the TCP link which needs a three-way handshake.
Because attackers will not hide themselves through changing IPs, they would choose to use approach 3 and 4, to imitate the behavior of legitimate users to avoid detection. The simulation is carried out for all approaches.
Resistance for App-DDoS attacks
The function of the AM based HMM model is to resist the App-DDoS attacks effectively. To improve the performance of victim resources, AM is applied, which 
Figure 3.6 Network after Prevention of App-DDoS attacks
Figure 3.6 shows that the less trustworthy nodes 31 to node 36 are prevented from the network, and this has been identified by the trust models in the proposed work. These node details are maintained in the blacklist. After the expiration of blacklist, the nodes are permitted to enter into the network and it is checked whether the nodes possess high trust values.
Summary
This chapter discusses about the process of mitigating App-DDoS attacks with
Trust and AM based HMM models. The AM is used to capture the spatial temporal patterns. These patterns are recognized by HMM, which describe the dynamics of Access
Matrix. The trust models ensure the trustworthiness of users. If the user secures a value below the trust value, they are immediately banned from the victim server. The results of this Trust and AM based HMM models show that, the proposed scheme quickly detects the App-DDoS attacks, and restrict such attacks from the network.
